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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court resolved a 
critical dispute regarding the interpretation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”)1 and its notice requirement.  In Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,2 the Court settled the definition of 
“willful” violation—a determination that will have enormous effects 
for insurance companies.  Specifically, the Court held that willfulness 
not only includes knowing violations, but also includes a violation 
committed in reckless disregard of statutory obligations.  Although 
both of the insurance companies in Burr were technically victorious—
both were held not to have willfully violated the FCRA—the Court’s 
interpretation of willfulness is more consumer-friendly.  Still, Burr 
may have left the door open for insurance companies to avoid the 
notice requirement of the FCRA. 
II.  FACTS 
Burr is a consolidated action involving two insurance companies, 
GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”) and Safeco 
Insurance Company of America (“Safeco”).3 
 
 * 2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2006). 
 2. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 2205. 
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Both cases involve interpretations of the FCRA.  The relevant 
portion of the FCRA requires notice to a consumer subjected to 
“adverse action . . . based in whole or in part on any information 
contained in a consumer [credit] report.”4  The notice must, among 
other things, inform the consumer of the adverse action.5  In terms of 
insurance companies, an “adverse action” is “a denial or cancellation 
of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or 
unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any 
insurance, existing or applied for.”6  Furthermore, anyone who 
“willfully fails” to provide notice under these provisions of the FCRA 
is liable to the consumer for actual, statutory and punitive damages.7 
In the first of the consolidated cases, GEICO used an applicant’s 
credit score as part of a variety of information to select the 
appropriate subsidiary insurance company, and the particular rate at 
which a policy was to be issued.8  GEICO’s policy was to compare a 
given applicant’s company and credit rate tier placement with the 
company and tier placement that would have been assigned if it had 
been calculated without reliance on credit history.9  In such cases, the 
applicant is provided only with an adverse-action notice if the 
“neutral” approach would have afforded them a lower priced tier or 
company.  Respondent, Edo, had his credit score considered when his 
policy was issued.10  However, because a neutral score would not have 
changed his company or tier, no adverse-action notice was sent to the 
applicant.11 
In the second of the two consolidated cases, Safeco similarly 
utilized credit reports when determining initial insurance premiums.12  
Here, Respondents Burr and Massey were offered higher rates than 
the best possible rate because of their credit scores.13  As with the first 
case, the applicants did not receive adverse-action notices.14 
 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a). 
 5. Id. 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n)(a). 
 8. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 9. Id. at 2206–07. 
 10. Id. at 2207. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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In both cases, the applicants initially brought suit, seeking 
statutory and punitive damages and claiming that the insurance 
companies were in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) by willfully 
failing to provide notice of an adverse action.15  The district court in 
the first case granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO, finding 
that there is no adverse action when the premium charged would 
have been the same regardless of whether the credit report 
information had been considered.16  The district court granted Safeco 
summary judgment as well, but on somewhat different grounds.  The 
lower court found that an initial rate for a new insurance policy 
cannot be an “increase”—as required for an “adverse action”—
without prior dealings.17  In the absence of a previous rate, no 
comparison exists, meaning that no increase is possible, and 
consequently no adverse action occurred.18 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed both judgments.  In 
the case of GEICO, it held that if a consumer “would have received a 
lower rate for his insurance had the information in his consumer 
report been more favorable, an adverse action has been taken against 
him.”19  Because a better credit score could have assigned the 
applicant to a more affordable company, notice was required.20  In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit interpreted willfulness to include a 
reckless disregard to comply with the FCRA.21  Similarly, the appeals 
court reversed the district court in the action against Safeco, relying 
on its reasoning in GEICO’s case that the notice requirement applies 
to an initial dealing between the insurance company and an 
applicant.22 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues.  The 
first issue is whether willful failure under the FCRA includes a 
violation committed in reckless disregard of the consumer’s rights.  
Second, if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then 
 
 15. Id. at 2206–07. 
 16. Edo v. GEICO Cas. Co., No. CV 02-678 BR, 2004 WL 3639689, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 
2004). 
 17. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2206. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1099. 
 22. Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746, 747 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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the Court would proceed to determine whether GEICO and Safeco 
committed reckless violations of the FCRA. 
III.  HOLDING AND REASONING  
As to the first question, the Supreme Court held that willfulness 
does in fact include a violation committed in reckless disregard of the 
notice obligation.23  Although some confusion may have existed 
regarding whether recklessness is determined objectively or 
subjectively, the Court held that reckless disregard is an objective 
standard.  The Court reasoned that there is a difference between the 
use of the term “willfully” in the civil versus the criminal context.24  
Accordingly, the common-law usage in civil cases treats violations in 
reckless disregard as willful violations.25  Therefore, willfulness 
includes action taken with “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is 
either known or so obvious that it should be known.”26 
The Court then addressed the issue of whether GEICO and 
Safeco acted recklessly in violation of the FCRA.  First, in considering 
this issue, the court disagreed with the district court’s rationale in the 
action against Safeco.  The Supreme Court held that initial rates 
charged for new insurance policies may constitute adverse actions.27  
A decrease, and thus an adverse action, does not require prior dealing 
between the insurance company and the applicant.  Finding no policy 
rationale and no legislative history to support separate treatment of 
first-time applicants, the Court determined that such applicants are 
equally covered by the FCRA.28 
Second, the Court held that for an adverse action to be “based . . . 
on” a credit report, the credit report must be a necessary condition for 
the difference in rates.29 Because “based . . . on” suggests but-for 
causation, notice is only required if the applicant would have 
benefitted had the credit report not been examined.30  In other words, 
 
 23. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 2215. 
 27. Id. at 2210–11. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2212. 
 30. Id. 
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the use of a credit score must have been disadvantageous to the 
applicant.31 
Next, to calculate whether the applicant has been disadvantaged, 
the issue becomes to which baseline rate the actual rate received 
should be compared.  The Government and respondents argued that 
the applicant should be entitled to notice anytime his credit score was 
used as long as he would have received a better rate with the highest 
possible credit score.32  The Court disagreed.  Instead, it determined 
that the crucial inquiry is whether the applicant actually suffered from 
the use of his credit score.33  To determine this, the applicant’s actual 
rate should be compared to the rate he would have received if his 
credit score had not been used.34  If the actual rate is not higher than 
this baseline rate, then the applicant has not been harmed by the use 
of the credit report.35 
After establishing the legal standards, the Court addressed the two 
claims at hand. In the action against GEICO, it determined that 
GEICO was under no obligation to provide adverse-action notice 
when the applicant received the same initial rate that he would have 
received had his credit report not been considered.36  Consequently, in 
the absence of a duty to provide notice, GEICO was not in violation 
of the FCRA.37  Safeco, on the other hand, was in a different position.  
Because Safeco’s use of the credit report may have led to different 
rates for the applicants, Safeco may have violated the FCRA by 
failing to give notice to the applicants.  However, the insurance 
company did not act with the requisite recklessness.  According to the 
Court, the common-law standard for recklessness requires “an 
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that 
it should be known.”38  Because Safeco’s interpretation of the 
FCRA—reading that there cannot be an “increase” in the charges 
upon the first interaction with the applicant—was not unreasonable, it 
“falls well short of raising the ‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating the 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2213. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 2214. 
 37. Id. at 2215–16. 
 38. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). 
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statute necessary for reckless liability.”39  Therefore, Safeco was not 
liable for statutory or punitive damages.  
IV.  IMPACT 
Although both insurance companies avoided liability under the 
FCRA, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burr reveals that consumers 
may have been victorious on several key issues.  That being said, the 
Court seems to have drawn the roadmap for compliance with the 
FCRA notice requirement. 
The Court made two key determinations that will make life more 
difficult for insurance companies going forward.  First, the Court 
chose to adopt a more consumer-friendly standard for recovery than 
the insurance companies sought.  GEICO and Safeco argued that the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was inconsistent with other federal 
appellate court decisions that held a violation of the FCRA requires 
that the insurance entity act with the understanding that its actions 
are not permitted.40  However, by agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation that includes recklessness within the definition of 
willfulness, the Court adopted a consumer-friendly interpretation. 
This distinction is crucial.  Under the Court’s holding, an insurance 
company is acting recklessly if its interpretation of the statute was 
highly unreasonable, and it should have known of the 
unreasonableness, even if the company subjectively believed that it 
was acting legally and not violating the rights of its consumers.  From 
a practical view, consumers bringing suits will have an easier time 
proving a violation because they will no longer have to find evidence 
showing that the companies had knowledge of their risk of violating 
the FCRA. 
Second, the Court determined that the notice requirement for 
adverse actions applies equally to first-time customers.  The argument 
of the insurance companies had literal merit.  As mentioned above, 
for a cognizable adverse action under the FCRA, the statute requires 
 
 39. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 40. See, e.g., Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2004) (“To act 
willfully, a defendant must knowingly and intentionally violate the [FCRA], and it must also be 
conscious that [its] act impinges on the rights of others.”); Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 370 
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a willful violation is nothing less than the “knowing and intentional 
commission of an act the defendant knows to violate the law”). 
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an “increase” in the amount charged to the consumer.  Again, the 
companies argued that for an increase to exist, there must be at least 
one prior quote to serve as a base of comparison.  However, the Court 
noted—and correctly so—that there was no policy reason for this 
reading, and instead, “increase” simply requires that the rate is higher 
than it would have otherwise been, an interpretation that applies 
equally to first-time customers.41  As with the interpretation of 
willfulness, this reading is significant.  Had the Court agreed with the 
insurance companies, the notice obligation would leave an enormous 
loophole in the FCRA’s notice requirement. 
But, the remainder of the Court’s opinion appears to offer a safe 
harbor for insurance companies.  After setting forth a consumer-
friendly standard for willfulness and broadening the base of 
individuals covered by the FCRA, the Court moved to the question of 
which baseline rate should be the standard of comparison for the 
actual rate when determining whether there was an increase.  The 
Court determined that the proper comparison was what the applicant 
would have been charged if the credit report had not been used, as 
opposed to what the customer would have been charged if his credit 
report was better.42 
This comparison leads to a curious result.  Consider a company 
with a policy similar to GEICO’s—that is, an insurance company that 
offers applicants an average rate when it does not check the 
applicant’s credit score.  Thus, if an applicant’s credit score is 
considered, anyone with an average or above average credit score 
cannot by definition be harmed by the use of their credit report.  This 
is the case even if they could have received a much better rate with a 
higher score. 
Justice Stevens carries this point even further.  What if it is the 
policy of an insurance company not to deal with applicants when the 
company does not check its credit report?  The odd result that follows 
is that an applicant is never harmed when the credit score is part of 
the computation.  Consequently, the insurance company is never 
required to give notice. 
 
 41. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2210–11. 
 42. Id. at 2213. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
At first glance, Burr appears to be a clear cut victory for the 
insurance companies.  However, a deeper reading reveals that the 
Court has ruled against insurers on several significant issues.  Still, 
while the ultimate result is unclear, it is quite possible that the Court 
has left a loophole for insurance companies to avoid the adverse-
action notice requirement of the FCRA altogether.  
